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to proxy fights where issues are reasonably related to corporate welfare.40
And reasonableness should depend on not only the issues involved, but the
insurgents' good faith, the strength of shareholder support enlisted, and the
type and amount of expenditure.44 With the sanction of such case-by-case
determination, stockholders will be discouraged from extravagant and capri-
cious campaigning. An outright reasonableness test, therefore, is a more
valid measure than the "policy-reasonable cost" standard and can effectively
control solicitation expenditures.
Two methods are available for judicial enforcement of losing dissenters'
reimbursement claims. In a direct suit by the losers against the corporation
payment might be ordered.45 Or courts could indirectly enforce payment by
enlarging management's derivative suit liability. Thus they could hold
management's outlay unreasonable and compel restitution to the corporate
treasury unless the losers' reasonable claims were honored by management,
43. Cf. Hall v. Translux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 7, 171 Adt.
226 (Ch. 1934) (merger and stock dividend); Hand v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co.,
54 F. Supp. 649 (D.Del. 1944) (plan for liquidation); Empire Southern Gas Co. v.
Gray, 46 A.2d 741 (Del. Ch. 1946) (merger or maintaining costly suite of offices);
Peel v. London & NA.. Ry. Co., [19071 1 Ch. Div. 5 (190G) (conference on inter-
railway cooperation, use of larger railway cars, and more elaborate statistical system).
See also Emerson & Latcham, supra note 16 (management's record of neglect and poor
performance). Two types of issue which may be involved in an election contest can be
distinguished: the directors may be challenged because they stand for particular policies
whose desirability for the future is questioned, or because they stand for a record of
performance whose promise for the future is doubted. Issues of the latter type, though
difficult to cast into the mold of a "policy" formula, would seem at least equal to the
former in potential importance to corporate welfare.
44. No court has yet held any expenditures improper in a "policy" contest. When
courts are convinced that nothing more is involved than the spoils of corporate office,
however, their scrutiny becomes closer. In such cases, the tendency has been to limit
expenditures of corporate funds by declaring improper the means of solicitation principally
employed. Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Walker, 92 Prrrs. Lna. J. 464 (C.P. Alleghany
County 1944) (employment of professional proxy solicitors) ; Lavyers' Advertising Co.
%% Consolidated Ry. L. & R. Co., 187 N.Y. 395, 80 N.E. 199 (1907) (newspaper adver-
tisements); but cf., In re Zickl, 73 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (employment of
professional proxy solicitors held "entirely proper" without discussion of nature of
issues). Use of professional proxy solicitors is apparently standard practice today.
See Regulation X-14, Schedule 14A, Item 3.
45. Cost reimbursement of successful plaintiffs in derivative suits may afford useful
precedent. Cf. Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Cannon v.
Parker, 151 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1945). See Note, 36 CoRn'aL L.Q. 558 (1951). In
such cases; no separate suit for cost recovery need Le brought, however. The award is
usually made as a part of the adjudication in which the claim to it arises. But see
N.Y. GEx. CoRp. LAW § 65 (permitting separate suit). Moreover, it is usually made "out
of" the particular fund or property which is the subject of the original suit. Alternatively,
losing dissenters might seek to recover at law in quasi-contract. See DAwso:;, U:jus1T
E-MUCMMENr 113 (1951): "[T]here is nothing in our prestnt conceptions that prev, at;
an appropriate unjust enrichment remedy from being used in any field."
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either before suit or after a decree so conditioned.40 This device is prefer-
able47 because it would 6rdinarily assure reimbursement without litigation.
Yet the legitimacy of contestants' disbursements can still be judicially tested.
If management doubts the reasonableness of insurgents' outlays, it may refuse
repayment though its own proxy costs are paid by the corporation. Insur-
gents could then bring a derivative suit. In such case, the reasonableness
of both management's and insurgents' expendituies would be subjected to
juaicial scrutiny. Oh the other hand, if management too readily acquiesces
in the losers' claims, other shareholders can, in a derivative suit, force it to
repay all unreasonable proxy solicitation outlays of both sides.
TOWARD CERTAINTY IN THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
EFFECT OF DIVORCE DECREES*
A SEETMINGLY valid divorce granted in one state may have to stand the
test of collateral challenge in another state.' If the divorced couple have both
46. Equity can readily fashion alternative or conditional decrees, See, e.g., Mc-
Candless v. Furlaud, 296 U.S. 140 (1935) ; Hayward v. Leeson, 176 Mass. 310, 57 N.E.
656 (1900).
47. Statutory restrictions often impede bringing derivative suits. See N.Y. Gtx.
CORP. LAW § 61 (contemporaneous ownership), § 61-b (security for costs); cf. Weinstein
v. Bein, 65 N.Y.S.2d 536 (Sup. Ct. 1946), 68 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup, Ct. 1947), aff'd ini't,.,
272 App. Div. 1045, 75 N.Y.S.2d 284 (lst Dep't 1947), appeal denied, 273 App, Div,
877, 77 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1st Dep't 1948), appeal dismissed, 298 N.Y. 506, 80 N.E.2d 656
(1948). See also note 20 supra. But the mere possibility of derivative suit here may
lead to solicitation cost recovery without litigation. Moreover, the "contemporaneous
ownership" rule will be no bar to actual suit. The gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint is
management's wrongful failure to reimburse them for reasonable proxy solicitation
expenditures. Thus they typically are shareholders at the time of the wrong complained
of. Nor should any requirement of prior demand on management and shareholders hinder
action. Cf. Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Albany & Susquehanna R. Co., 213 U.S. 435
(1909). And "security for costs" statutes can be hurdled by joinder of sufficient plain-
tiffs, aggregating their stock ownership to meet statutory requirements. Baker v.
MacFadden Publications, Inc., 300 N.Y. 325, 90 N.E.2d 876 (1950). Furthermore,
plaintiffs having any reasonable claim for reimbursement should almost automatically
win. Thus, even if bond for defendants' costs were posted, there would be no liability
on it. See STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 174 (2d ed. 1949).
*Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581 (1951).
1. In an attack of this nature, the divorce is generally pleaded defensively as a bar
to the plaintiff's claim. E.g., Matter of Lindgren's Estate, 293 N.Y. 18, 55 N.E.2d 849
(1944) ; In re Davis' Estate, 38 Cal. App. 2d 579, 101 P.2d 761 (1940) ; see also Jacobs,
Attack on Decrees of Divorce, 34 MIcH. L. RIv. 749 (1936) ; id. at 959. The plaintiff
must demand that the court hold the foreign decree invalid and of no binding effect in
the present forum. He invokes the court's power to reexamine the jurisdictional basis
of the foreign decree. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
Jurisdiction to render a 4ecree of divorce is founded upon the bona fide domicile
of at least one party. GOODRICH, CoNFLicr OF LAWS §§ 128, 131 (3d ed. 1949). Juris-
diction over one party is said to give the court jurisdiction over the "res" of the
marriage. The in rem character of the adjudication makes it "binding on the whole
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come under the jurisdiction of the court which granted the decree,2 res
judicata precludes these parties from attacking the decree collaterally.3 But
sometimes the challenger is a third person with an injured right or interest.4
If he is not so closely identified with the divorcees as to be termed "in privity"
with them, res judicata will not bar a collateral attack by him.5
The measure of privit3, however, is not a precise one. Jurisdictions may
differ on the standing of a third person to challenge a divorce decree.0 Thus, a
world," which of course include the other party. Domicile for divorce purposes is in
turn dependent upon two factors: a statutory period of residence within the state and
the highly illusory "intent" to make it the party's "home." GoomiciC, Co,-Fccr or" Ltws
64 (3d ed. 1949). Thus if one is not careful to provide the outward signs of such an
intention, courts in other states frequently find no bona fide domicile, hence no jurisdic-
tion in the granting court, hence an invalid divorce. E.g., Smerda v. Smerda, 74 X.E2d
751 (Ohio C.P. 1947); Lynch v. Lynch, 210 Miss. 810, 50 So.2d 378 (1951);
Myers v. Connor, 93 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
2. A court may acquire jurisdiction over the defendant if he is domiciled within
the state, personally served within the state, or if he appears before the court. Lynn v.
Lynn, 302 N.Y. 193, 97 N.E.2d 748 (1951); Shea v. Shea, 270 App. Div. 527, 60
N.Y.S.2d 823 (2d Dep't 1946). See GooDRIcH, Co-TFL c oF LAws 187 (3d ed. 1949);
Harper, The Myth of the Void Divorce, 2 LAw & COTm.. PaoD. 335, 336 (1935).
3. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 350 (1948): "res judicata applies to
adjudications relating either to jurisdiction of the person or of the subject matter
where such adjudications have been made in proceedings in which those questions were
in issue and in which the parties were given full opportunity to litigate" See aso Coe
v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378 (1948); Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1933); Comment, Divorce
Jurisdiction By Consent of the Parties-Developments Since "Sherrer v. Shcrrer," 26
IT-hu. UJ. 380 (1951).
4. Some courts limit a third persoh's right to attack collaterally to situations where
his interest existed prior to the former judgment and was injured at the time the decree
vas rendered. See 1 FnRELm1, JUflGIENTs 636, § 319 (5th ea. 1925); de Marigny
v. de Mlarigny, 43 So.2d 442, 447 (Fla. 1949); Gaylord v. Gaylord 45 So2d 507, 5&9
(Fla. 1950); State ex rel. Van Hafften v. Ellison, 2R5 Mo. 301, 316, 226 S.W. 559,
563 (1920).
The more general rule is that the third party attacker must simply show at the time
of his suit that he suffers injury by the decree. Urquhart v. Urquhart, 272 App. Div. 60,
69 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1st Dep't 1947), aff'd 297 N.Y. 6S9, 77 N.E.2d 7 (1947) ; Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Porter 324 Mass. 581, 5S9, 88 N.E.2d 135, 140 (1949); Ex Parke Nimmer,
212 S.C. 311, 319, 47 S.E.2d 716, 717 (1948).
5. Ainscow v. Alexander, 28 Del. Ch. 545, 39 A.2d 54 (Ch. 1944) ; Matter of Lind-
gren's Estate, 293 N.Y. 18, 55 N.E.2d 849 (1944). See also France v. Freeze, 4 Wash.2d
120, 102 P.2d 687 (1940).
"Privity" was defined by the Supreme Court in Bigelow v. Old Dominion Mining
& Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 129 (1912), as "mutual or successive relationship tu
the same right of property." There have been several minor variations in te wording
of the definition; but all attempt to denote a degree of affinity with the interests of the
primary parties such that the interest or right adjudicated and that suscqueiatly cainim.,
are substantially the same. 1 Fa'. X, Jt GmuNrrs 959, §433 (5ti ed. 1925) (ca es
cited).
6. Compare Estate of Davis, 38 Cal. App. 2d 579, 585 (1940) where the court states,
"As a general rule, an heir being in privity with the ancestor is bound by an estoppel
which was binding upon the ancestor." with Matter of Lindgren 293 N.Y. 18, 55 N.E2J
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particular challenger may be estopped as a privy by the state which rendered
the decree but permitted to attack under the law of the state in which his suit
is brought. Does the Full Faith and Credit clause, in dictating that the
decree of one state shall have uniform effect in all states,7 require that the
rule of the state which granted the divorce determine the standing of potential
challengers in all states? In the past the requirement of full faith has not
been considered applicable to this determination. Customarily, courts have
not relied on the law of the granting state in measuring the standing of the
third party attacker.8
Johnson v. Mitelberger upset this practice.9 There the daughter by a first
marriage tried to prevent her deceased father's third wife from claiming her
widow's statutory share of the estate. 10 The entire estate had been willed to the
daughter. She maintained that her father's divorce from his second wife in
Florida was invalid and hence his subsequent marriage void. Since the father
had entered a generalappearance in the Florida action, the decree was res
judicata as to him. The New York Court of Appeals, noting that the daughter
was not in privity with her father, allowed the attack." But the Supreme
Court reversed. It determined that Florida law would bar the daughter's
challenge' 2 and held that, under the Full Faith and Credit clause, that bar
849 (1944) where it was held that a daughter was not in privity with her father and
therefore not subject to the disability that he bore.
7. U. S. CONsT. ART. IV, § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each state to the
Public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other state." For the only
legislative interpretation of the Clause, see Act of 1790, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948).
8. See Ainscow v. Alexander, 28 Del. Ch. 545, 555, 39 A.2d 54, 58 (Ch. 1944) ; In re
Brandt's Estate, 67 Ariz. 42, 45, 190 P.2d 497, 499 (1948); Mumma v. Mumna, 86
Cal. App.2d 133, 136, 194 P.2d 24, 26 (1948).
A survey of the cases reveals a notable absence from the opinions of citations to
cases of the state which rendered the divorce on the question of the standing of a third
person to challenge.
The question of full faith anf credit generally does not arise until after the court has
found the foreign court to have had jurisdiction to render the decree. Only then iq
the local court obliged to extend full faith andf credit to the foreign adjudication,
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). See also Runyan, The Problem of
Migratory Divorce, 37 A.B.A.J. 12 (1951).
9. 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
10. Notice of her election to take her intestate share of the decedent's estate was
filed under § 18 of the Decedents' Estate Law of the State of New York.
11. In re Johnson's Estate, 301 N.Y. 13, 92 N.E.2d 44 (1950).
A Florida case, State cx rel. Willys v. Chilling-worth, 124 Fla. 274, 168 So, 249
(1936), was also mentioned as permitting the daughter's collateral attack in Florida,
However the case was not directly in point since the question of res judicata Was not
involved.
12. The Court read two recent Florida cases to bar the daughter's attack on either
of two alternative theories: "If the laws of Florida should be that a surviving child is
in privity with its parent as to that parent's estate, surely the Florida doctrine of res
judicata would apply to the child's collateral attack as it would to the father's. If on
the other hand, Florida holds, as New York does in this case, that the chUd of a former
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must also operate in New York. The New York law on the point made no
appearance in the opinion. By this decision, the law of the state granting the
decree governs the right of collateral attack in sister states. 13
The principal effect of the Johnsonr rule is that a single standard now
measures the standing of all potential challengers of a particular divorce.
The divorced couple themselves benefit most by this effect. For them
the decision means that the strength of their decree does not vary with the
rules of the states in which the third person may bring his attack. By looking
to the law of the state which rendered their divorce, the divorcees can now
predict whether a third party attack may reestablish previous marital obliga-
tions or jeopardize the legal status of subsequent marriages and families.
On the other hand, the Johnson decision may adversely affect the interested
third person. He may be estopped from challenging a foreign adjudication
by a rule of a state other than his own. Thus his interest is at the mercy of a
foreign state which may wish to make its brand of divorce as attractive as
possible by rendering it relatively attack-proof. This can be accomplished
by the extension of "privity" to cover additional classes of third parties.14
To protect third persons, some limit should be put upon state courts' powers
to insulate their divorce decrees. Third parties are, in most cases, suing to
reclaim some property interest which has been injured or destroyed by the
divorce decree.1 5 Can courts protect such interests and simultaneously pre-
vent the injury to the primary parties which would result from the destruc-
tion of their status as divorcees? An analogous legal feat was accomplished
in Estin v. Estin,16 a suit between the primary parties. There the Supreme
Court held that while a Nevada divorce was a valid determination of the parties'
status as divorcees, the decree could not affect a previous New York separa-
tion allotment to the wife. Thus the "status" aspect of the decree was divided
from the "property" aspect.
marriage is a stranger to the divorce proceedings, late opinions of Florida indicate that
the child would not be permitted to attack the divorce, since the child had a mere
expectancy at the time of the divorce." 340 U. S. 5M1, 5,q (1951). For an evaluation
of these grounds for the decision see Comment, Divorce JudWsdiclion by Conscnt of tie
Parties-Developments Since "Shierrer v. Sherrer," 26 Im. L. J. M0, 335 (1951).
13. For recent applications of this rule see Kienle v. Kienle, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 239
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951); Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951).
14. In all probability internal restraints will prevent this power being used to the
utmost. It is notable that when the Nevada legislature removed the words "bona fide"
from before the word "domicile." the Nevada Supreme Court construed them back in
again. Latterner v. Latterner, 51 Nev. 285, 274 Pac. 194 (1929). Business interests,
however, do promote "easy divorce" laws in some states. See Ingram & Ballard,
The Business of Migratory Divorce in Nevada, 2 Lkw & CoNunzW. Peon. 302 (1935).
15. See, e.g., Loftis v. Dearing, 184 Tenn. 474, 201 SAV2d 655 (1947) ; InI re Davis'
Estate. 38 CaLApp.2d 579, 101 P.2d 761 (1940) ; Smith v. Foto, 235 Mich. 361, 230 N.W.
790 (1938).
16. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
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In application, however, it is not always easy to recognize the distinction.
Some divorce decrees contain explicit property settlements.1 7 In these cases
it is relatively simple to determine what is meant by the "property" portion of
the decree. But, where these settlements are lacking, the dissolution of the
marriage may still have a resultant effect upon property.18 Here it is more
difficult to delineate where "status" ends and "property" begins. A satis-
factory pragmatic test might be: if a state court can satisfy the property claim
without destroying the status effect of the foreign divorce, then the attack
is upon the "property" aspect of the decree. In the Estin case the court could
order the ex-husband to continue to pay the separation allotment without
decreeing that he was still a married man. The attack then was on the
"property" aspect. 19 In the Johnson situation, on the other hand, the daughter
could not be awarded the entire estate without decreeing, in effect, that the
father was still married to his second wife at the time he "married" his third.
17. Such settlements, either contained in the decree or accompanying it, are most
commonly court orders fixing alimony, payments for the support of minor children, the
conveyance of certain tangible property over which the court has acquired jurisdiction,
or the direction to distribute some mutual holding of the parties' in a stated manner. See
Note, Marital Property and Migratory Divorce, 3 STAN. L. Rzv. 622 (1951). A much
noted case on the subject of an extraterritorial order to convey land is Fall v. Eastln,
215 U.S. 1 (1909).
18. Due to the time honored blending of status and property considerations in the
legal relationship of marriage, there are invariably some indirect effects on these prop-
erty rights when the marriage is dissolved (e.g., inheritance rights, right to support,
mutual property holdings). Some of these may involve third persons. Adams v.
Adams, 154 Mass. 290, 28 N.E. 260 (1891). The situation in the Johzson; case is an
example of such an indirect effect upon a third person's interest without a specific court
order on the matter. Further, the Johnson situation may be generalized to include cases
where any statutory or testamentary heir of the husband who occupied that status at
the time of the disputed divorce contests a subsequent wife's claim to the estate as a
widow. These challengers do not have less of an interest prior to the decree than the
daughter in the Johnson case. See note 12 supra. Again, several states still permit
husband and wife to hold property "by the entirety" with a right of survivorshilp.
KEEZER, MARMIAGE AND DIVORCE 24, § 15 (3d ed. 1946). Divorce, however converts
the holding to one "in common." Id. at 582, § 540. If, after a questionable divorce, the
husband predeceases his ex-wife, one of her heirs might claim the entire property agains4t
the ex-husband's heirs asserting the divorce was invalid and the wife at the time of
her death was the survivor and held the entire property. Still another instance occurs
under the laws of some states which provide that a husband shall be liable for the
antenuptial debts of his wife to the extent of the value of property he acquired from her.
See, e.g., 10 Mo. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 3391. Here a creditor of the wife, proceeding
against the husband after a foreign divorce, may assert the decree's invalidity in order to
maintain his prior claim, within the limits of the statute, against the husband.
Hypothetically, under the "family car" doctrine, or the husband's duty to supply his
wife with "necessaries," a tort or contract obligation incurred by the wife after a question.
able divorce might be maintained against the husband. The third party creditor would
attempt to destroy the effect of the decree insofar as it served to terminate the husband's
liability for these obligations.
19. 334 U.S. 541, 548 (1948).
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Here there is a necessary dependence of the daughter's property claim upon
the status effect of the divorce decree: to satisfy her claim the daughter must
destroy her adversary's status of "widow" which is grounded on the validity
of the status aspect of the divorce decree. Thus the attack was necessarily on
the "status" aspect of the Florida decree.*
The rule in the Johnson case should not be applied to collateral attacks
directed to "property." Third party challenges could then be barred by foreign
law only if a successful attack would destroy the divorcees' status. Such a
limitation provides certainty for the immediate parties as to their status and
yet allows third parties freedom from foreign bars in attacking the property
effect of a divorce decree. Since the Estin case also declares intangible property
adjudications to be in personam21 (as contrasted to the in rem character of a
"status" adjudication2 2 ), this limitation avoids conflict with the venerable
doctrine that in an action in personam, a party in one state cannot be bound as
a privy by the adjudication of another state's court.2 3
20. The suggested limitation of the Johnson rule would of course encounter the
criticism originally levelled at the Estin "divisible divorce" result: that such a division
does not further certainty but rather adds to the confusion (See Jackson's dissent from the
Estin opinion, 334 U.S. 541, 553). This argument asserts that one cannot be married
for the purpose of some obligations and not for others. However, such a contention loses
sight of the multiple roles of "marriage" and treats the collective term as an indivisible
unit. Incidents of marriage have already disappeared in many states without any
noticeable increment in the confusion. E.g., abolition of the right previously protected
by actions for alienation of affection and criminal conversation, Coimroz, CA,sIs on
DomEsnc RELxiors 34 (Ist ed. 1951) ; alterations of rights of dower, e.g., N.Y. RtAL
PRoP. LAw. §§ 189, 190 (1945); Schneider & Landesman, "Life, Liberts-and Dower,"
19 N.Y.U.L.Q. 343-69 (1942).
21. 334 U.S. 541, 548-9 (1948). The Estin case involved an "intangible" property
right and "[jjurisdiction over an intangible can indeed only arise from control or power
over the persons whose relationships are the source of the rights and obligations." Id.
at 548. The same rule applies to tangible property located outside the state. Goormicn,
CoN -acr or LAws § 138 (3d ed. 1949). A court, however, may acquire jurisdiction
over the rest of the property by virtue of its physical location within the forum state.
In such a case the adjudication is said to be in rem. REsT.YATE.T, Jtt.MENTs §2,
comment a (1942).
22. "A decree of divorce so far as it affects the status of the parties is considered a
judgment in rem and, if free from fraud and collusion, is binding on the whole world."
2 paiEmmA, JGmTrs § 906, (5th ed. 1925).
23. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Mining and Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912).
The issue in this case was the res judicata effect of a New York proceeding against
one or two joint tortfeasors (corporation promoters) in a subsequent suit on identical
charges against the other tortfeasor in Massachusetts. The Court held that an in
personam decree could not bind one who was not in the jurisdiction of the court whether
he be privy or not. This general principle was stated by the American Law Institute
in the REsTATEMNT, Coxriacr op LAws §450 (d) as follows: "A judgment is valid
only as against parties who were subject to the jurisdiction of the court which rendered
the judgment and persons in privity with them. The law of a state where a valid judg-
ment is rendered determines who are in privity with the parties to the judgment If by
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